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Abstract 
Organizational downsizing places many strains on surviving employees. Despite the implicit 
relationship between changes to communication networks and employee responses, few studies 
examine downsizing-induced network changes or the impact of these changes on employees. 
This longitudinal investigation examined fluctuations in structural holes within a hospitality 
company's corporate headquarters resulting from the loss and gain of communication contacts. 
Building on Burt's treatise on structural holes, we tested a measurement of structural holes and 
its relationship to layoff survivors' perceptions of organizational chaos and their willingness to 
participate in planned, post downsizing changes. Although the downsizing had a modest impact 
on surviving employees' structural hole experiences overall, the structural hole index was a 
significant predictor in longitudinal and within time period comparisons of employees’ 
perceptions of chaos and openness to change. 
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Downsizing and Structural Holes: Their Impact on Layoff Survivors’ Perceptions of 
Organizational Chaos and Openness to Change 
 
 Employees face many challenges following a downsizing. Layoff survivors experience 
the loss of coworkers, friends, supervisors, subordinates, and access to valued organizational 
resources (Brockner, 1988). The loss or reconfiguring of relationships can influence employee 
morale, well-being, self-esteem, and performance (Kozlowski, Chao, Smith, & Hedlund, 1993). 
Changes in communication network relationships and their impact on layoff survivors is of great 
interest to organizational scholars for at least two reasons. First, the trend of laying off workers 
and dramatically changing the networks of survivors shows the tenuous nature of modem 
employment. Second, the opening or closing of structural holes in survivors’ networks can 
provide a communication-based understanding of a downsizing's impact on employee responses. 
Members of a network or a series of networks compete for valuable resources to 
maximize their power. Structural holes exist in a network where links to unique sources of 
information or resources are not present. Conversely, the addition of links providing unique 
sources of information or resources closes structural holes. Structural holes in networks are 
usually conceptualized at the macro level where actors in markets and organizations compete for 
valued resources (Burt, 1992a). However, the application of structural holes at the individual 
level can also be beneficial, especially in the case of organizational downsizing. By examining 
the impact of the opening and closing of structural holes on the attitudes and perceptions of 
downsizing survivors, researchers can explore why some employees remain upbeat when a 
downsizing casts a pall over most workers and emphasizes their vulnerability. Such research can 
also explore macro-micro linkages within organizations that are often neglected in organizational 
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research (Jablin, 1987; Krackhardt & Porter, 1985, 1986; Monge & Eisenberg, 1987; Rousseau, 
1985; Sparrowe & Liden, 1997; Staw & Sutton, 1993). Thus, the goals of this article are to (a) 
create an index that measures structural holes in communication networks prior to and following 
an organizational downsizing and (b) assess the impact of structural holes on layoff survivors' 
perceptions of organizational chaos and openness to change. 
 
Organizational Downsizing and Structural Holes 
Structural Holes 
A structural hole exists when two members who are not directly connected to one another 
also lack common network contacts. Structural holes make networks constrained or sparse as 
individuals have fewer opportunities to access information and other resources. In an 
organizational unit with many structural holes, members may exchange a considerable amount of 
information and resources with one another (i.e., redundant contacts) but will have few unique 
contacts (i.e., nonredundant contacts) with others outside of the unit. In an organizational unit 
with few structural holes, members will share a considerable number of redundant contacts 
within the unit and will have a large number of extra-unit connections. Therefore, employees 
with many structural holes in their network depend on their supervisor or a few prominent 
network contacts for information and opportunities and are less likely to receive promotions. In 
contrast, employees with few structural holes receive information and opportunities from 
numerous sources and are more likely to capitalize on their unique connections to advance in the 
organization. 
Structural holes can provide information access and power opportunities for network 
members and can create inequality between members. Structural holes also vary in their 
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influence on network members. For example, when a downsizing results in an employee 
receiving a new supervisor who also brings unique contacts, the employee gains new information 
or resources through the new connection. Conversely, the change in network relationships can 
also create inequality among other network members who lost connections in the supervisory 
change or who are denied connections by the new supervisor. An individual’s gain or loss from a 
structural hole is contingent on the individual’s access to available resources. 
The potential gains and losses associated with structural holes in pre- and postdownsizing 
networks derive from three types of opportunities (or “capital”; Burt, 1992b, p. 8): social, 
human, and financial. Social opportunities arise from the formation of new social relationships 
with others, and are available to all network members. Human opportunities represent the 
education, experience, and know-how an individual brings to others. Financial opportunities 
represent tangible resources such as money, investments, or equipment that are needed to 
perform work functions and are not necessarily equally available to all network members. Lost 
social ties may be particularly difficult to replace and can leave network members isolated. For 
instance, a downsizing in your department or unit can leave fewer members with whom to 
interact (a loss of social capital). A downsizing can also remove a coworker who was helpful in 
solving specialized statistical or mathematical applications (a loss of human capital) or whose 
talents included quick travel authorizations or equipment purchases (a loss of financial capital). 
Burt’s (1991, 1992b) measurements of structural holes are principally based on indicators 
of structural autonomy. Structural autonomy examines how access to unique information and 
resources is limited by connections to network members (Burt, 1992b), but does not explicitly 
consider network influence or position as a means to gain access to resources. In contrast, 
prominence explicitly considers the influence inherent in network positions. Existing studies of 
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structural holes use various indicators including prominence (e.g., Ibarra, 1995) but provide little 
information to explain why certain indicators are used and others are not. A combined index of 
prominence and autonomy indicators to measure structural holes under conditions of downsizing 
can (a) provide a unified instrument to assess specific dimensions of the structural hole construct, 
(b) reveal which indicators should be included in a unified structural hole measure, (c) examine 
structural holes’ impact on the individual by associating network properties with individual-level 
perceptions and attitudes in organizations, and (d) further explain layoff survivors’ reactions to 
shifts in their postdownsizing communication networks. For the purpose of establishing a 
reliable and valid measure of structural holes at the individual level of observation, tests 
weighing the contribution of potential indicators to a theoretical construct and to relevant 
outcomes must be undertaken. 
 
The Measurement of Structural Holes 
Cohesion and structural equivalence assumptions are fundamental to any network 
analysis. Cohesion represents the extent to which two network members have regular and 
frequent interactions (Burt, 1992a; Johnson, 1993), and structural equivalence describes the 
extent to which they have the same or similar contacts (Burt, 1991). The degree to which 
cohesion and structural equivalence impact employees in a network is described as the sum of a 
member’s opportunity and constraint in a network, also known as “structural autonomy’ (Burt, 
1992b, p. 44). Burt (1991) identified eight indicators of structural autonomy: (a) nonredundant 
contacts, (b) network contacts, (c) contact efficiency, (d) proportional density, (e) network 
density, (f) constraint, (g) oligopoly, and (h) hierarchy. Together, these items describe structural 
holes by generating scores on a continuum, usually ranging from .00 to 1.00. Rather than 
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identifying employees as acting in the absence or presence of a structural hole, scores of greater 
magnitude indicate that a network member is experiencing more structural holes. The following 
section describes the indicators of structural autonomy, their relationships to structural holes, and 
how they would be affected by an organizational downsizing (see Table 1). 
 
 NONREDUNDANT CONTACTS 
Nonredundant contacts are a network member’s unique or nonduplicated sources of 
information and resources. Scores of nonredundancy range from zero to the possible number of 
contacts in the network (N - 1) and represent the effective size of a member’s network (Burt, 
1991, 1992b). These contacts represent a source of advantage to the recipient of the 
nonredundant contact (Burt, 1991, 1992b). As a result of downsizing, nonredundant ties can be 
lost by either dismissal or by becoming redundant. When nonredundant contacts are lost and not 
replaced, the void created represents a structural hole. 
 
 CONTACTS 
Network contacts represent the number of members connected to an employee (Burt, 
1991, 1992b). The number of contacts can range from zero (for an isolated network member) to 
the possible number of contacts in the network (N - 1). Although downsizing will decrease the 
number of contacts possible for any network member, losing contacts per se does not form a 
structural hole. Contacts gained or lost can be either redundant or nonredundant. The loss of 
nonredundant contacts leads to the creation of structural holes, as their absence reduces available 
information and opportunities. 
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 CONTACT EFFICIENCY 
Contact efficiency is the number of nonredundant ties divided by the total number of 
contacts. Efficiency indicates what proportion of a member’s contacts are nonredundant (Burt, 
1991, 1992b). The loss of efficiency in a network can result from a decrease in nonredundant 
contacts and/or an increase in total contacts. Downsizing can increase or decrease network 
members’ efficiency depending on the losses (or gains) they experience. Structural holes emerge 
where efficiency is lost. 
 
 PROPORTIONAL DENSITY 
This measure reports the proportion of contact pairs that are directly connected to each 
other. Density scores range from zero, indicating no relations between contacts, to one, 
indicating all pairs of contacts are connected (Burt, 1991, 1992b). As more contact pairs become 
connected, the proportional density experienced by an individual increases. The number of 
structural holes experienced by a member should decrease with higher proportional density, 
indicating a greater distribution of contacts and greater redundancy. Conversely, lower 
proportional density represents a smaller distribution of contacts and a greater possibility for 
structural holes. 
 
 NETWORK DENSITY 
An alternative measure to proportional density, network density reports the “strength” 
surrounding the relationships of contact pairs (cf. Granovetter, 1973, 1982). Strength refers to the 
“numerical description of the amount of interaction between two network members” (Monge & 
Contractor, 1987, p. 108) that is based on the distance or closeness between them. Network 
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density scores range from zero, indicating no relations between contacts, to one, indicating 
maximum strength between contacts (Burt, 1991, 1992b). As network density increases, the 
number of structural holes experienced by members should increase because members will have 
denser but fewer relationships. Conversely, lower network density represents a greater 
distribution of contacts and a decreased potential for structural holes. 
 
 CONSTRAINT 
Constraint represents the distribution of relationships across a member’s network (Burt, 
1992b). Constraint indicates to what extent a member’s interaction is dependent on a limited 
number of network members. Constraint scores vary from zero, indicating many redundant 
contacts, to one, indicating only one contact (Burt, 1991). Constraint is positively related to the 
formation of structural holes, as high constraint indicates more structural holes for an employee. 
An organizational downsizing leaves network members more constrained with fewer 
opportunities for nonredundant contacts, and hence more structural holes. 
 
 OLIGOPOLY 
Oligopoly refers to a member’s ability to substitute one set of contacts for another that is 
less constrained. Oligopoly scores range from zero, indicating high substitutability, to one, 
indicating low substitutability (Burt, 1991, 1992b). Employees with high levels of oligopoly 
have a high substitutability in their relationships and a lower possibility for experiencing 
structural holes. Downsizing may limit network members’ ability to locate substitutes for their 
existing relationships. 
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 HIERARCHY 
Hierarchy is a measure that represents the portion of constraint present across all member 
relations. Hierarchy is derived from a logarithmic transformation of the constraint measure 
including contacts and constraint (Burt, 1992b). Scores vary from zero, indicating equal 
constraint from all contacts, to one, when all constraint comes from one contact (Burt, 1991, 
1992b). Hierarchy indicates to what extent constraint is found in a network member’s most 
regular contacts (Burt, 1991, 1992b). Employees with high hierarchy scores will experience 
more structural holes as limited network contacts leave fewer opportunities to replace or expand 
existing network opportunities. 
 
Research on Structural Hole Indicators 
Network research to date uses a variety of the above indicators to measure structural 
holes. Burt presents two studies in his extensive description of structural holes. In a longitudinal 
analysis of product markets under stable market conditions, the first study (Burt, 1992b) 
examined the relationships between structural holes and producers’ ability to negotiate prices 
with both suppliers and consumers. Structural holes are measured by (a) producer concentration, 
indicating the lack of structural holes between producers; (b) constrained supplier-consumer 
interaction, representing the extent to which producers are constrained by the alliance of 
suppliers and consumers; and (c) density, the extent to which the bulk producers’ output is 
distributed to limited consumer markets. The results reveal that as producers experience more 
structural holes, their autonomy decreases (and profits decrease). Yet, when suppliers and 
consumers experience fewer structural holes, their autonomy and profit decrease. 
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In a second longitudinal study, Burt (1992b) examined the promotion rate of 284 
managers from a large, diversified company based on their proximity to structural holes. This 
investigation incorporated a measure of constraint to assess structural holes. Specifically, Burt 
asked managers to indicate how “close” they perceive themselves to other network contacts in 
order to produce a “closeness” score for each manager. Each manager’s overall closeness score 
was then related to the number of days since their last promotion. These analyses indicated that 
managers in conditions with higher levels of structural holes were promoted more quickly, 
implying that structural holes lead to greater network influence and resources. However, the 
effects of structural holes vary among different subgroups in the sample (e.g., women and older 
workers), suggesting that structural holes are not equally advantageous to all. 
In a related study, Ibarra (1995) used indicators of autonomy (e.g., density and contacts) 
to examine the effects of minority interaction in informal managerial networks. Ibarra reported 
that structural holes affect managers differently due to constraint in their network relationships. 
Specifically, when access to information or resources is limited, structural constraint inhibits 
minorities’ development of organizational network relationships (Ibarra, 1995). 
In sum, these studies use a number of structural autonomy indicators to measure network 
interactions and structural holes. These studies suggest that the configuration and location of 
communication relationships are dynamic and can affect other organizational factors such as 
promotion rate or access to organizational resources. Nonetheless, these studies provide little 
guidance to researchers for which indicators to use or exclude. If each of the structural hole 
indicators tap into various dimensions of the structural hole construct, the combined indicators 
should yield a single measure of a structural hole in a network. Further, these indicators should 
contribute equally when measuring the latent construct (structural holes) and be similarly related 
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to other variables of interest (Hunter & Gerbing, 1982). It is also unclear why few researchers 
have included prominence in the measurement of structural holes, since network prominence 
provides critical information on power relationships among network members. 
 
Prominence 
Whereas structural autonomy measures an employee’s contacts, information, and access 
to opportunities, prominence (or centrality) examines the extent to which a network contact is 
valuable or in demand by others (Brass & Burkhardt, 1992; Burt, 1991). Network members who 
offer valuable or interesting characteristics are typically more prominent in their network (Burt, 
1991; Knoke & Burt, 1983) and hold more power, influence, and upper-level positions in their 
work group or organization (Brass & Burkhardt, 1992, 1993; Friedkin, 1993; Ibarra, 1993). 
Prominence is one of the most frequently used network metrics (Monge & Eisenberg, 
1987). It refers to the degree to which an individual can be accessed by others in the network 
through more direct (i.e., fewer intermediaries) contacts (Johnson, 1993) or the number of 
linkages necessary to connect the member to all other members in the network (Freeman, 1979). 
Structural holes emerge when a centralized member is lost and the nonre- dundant ties unique to 
the central member are not replaced. Coworkers and subordinates relying on this member in a 
predownsizing environment may have difficulties obtaining work-related information and 
guidance after a downsizing if a suitable replacement is not available. Difficulties in task and 
social relationships created by downsizing can result in perceptions of chaos and uncertainty 
among layoff survivors. Prominence can be assessed in various ways through communication 
network data (Burt, 1991; Knoke & Burt, 1983). As presented in Table 1, Burt (1991) described 
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five: (a) choice status, (b) extensive relations, (c) exclusive relations, (d) power, and (e) 
percentage of power reflected. 
 
 CHOICE STATUS 
As a general indicator of prominence, choice status indicates the number of members 
who have contact with the employee divided by the total number of network members (excluding 
isolates). This measure ranges from zero to one, with low scores indicating minimal network 
contact (Burt, 1991). 
Choice status is limited to “space boundaries” used in network analysis (Monge & 
Contractor, 1987). As such, in networks researchers may elect to limit or extend analyses to 
capture specific network properties. For example, linkages can be described in terms of member 
“reachability” (i.e., relationships defined until a distance of three indirect contacts is surpassed or 
only direct contacts are considered). Limited or extended boundaries affect choice status because 
the total number of members who can reach one another will change as a function of the 
boundary set (Monge & Contractor, 1987). Similar to the “number of contacts” score in 
structural autonomy, choice status describes the extent to which the employee is connected to 
others in the network. Choice status differs from number of contacts because it is based on the 
number of members who can contact the member as opposed to the actual number of contacts. 
As choice status decreases for an employee, the possibility for the formation of structural holes 
increases, since the employee is being contacted by fewer network members. 
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 EXTENSIVE RELATIONS 
Extensive relations measures the degree to which a member has a large number of 
cohesive relations with others in the network. Scores vary from zero, indicating no relations, to 
one, indicating an extensive base of contacts (Burt, 1991). Low extensive relations scores 
indicate the presence of structural holes. In other words, employees with a low extensive 
relations score have fewer contacts. Less extensive network relations increase the chances of 
experiencing structural holes. 
 
 EXCLUSIVE RELATIONS 
This measure indicates the extent to which a member is the object of unshared relations 
from other members in the network. Exclusive relations reveal the time and effort allocated by 
others to interact with the member (Burt, 1991). Exclusivity in relationships implies that the 
network members deem the relationships valuable and maintain the relations at the cost of other 
relationships. Exclusive relationships are similar to nonredundant relationships in that both 
provide unique information or resources. Downsizing can affect the number of exclusive 
relationships in a member’s network. Scores on this measure vary from zero, indicating no 
exclusive relations, to one, indicating a high level of relations (Burt, 1991). As exclusive 
relations decrease for a member, more structural holes emerge. 
 
 POWER 
Burt (1991) defines power as the extent to which a member is connected to other 
influential members in the network. For example, a divisional manager is influential in a network 
because members connected to the manager can benefit from the manager’s power. Power scores 
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range from zero, for a network isolate, to one, representing the actor receiving the most relations 
from powerful others (Burt, 1991). As network members lose powerful contacts through 
downsizing, they lose access to the information and resources from those contacts and 
experience an increased number of structural holes. 
 
 PERCENTAGE OF POWER REFLECTED 
Percentage of power reflected measures the extent to which a network member returns 
messages received from others (Burt, 1991). This indicator considers the extent to which 
relationship exchanges are equally reciprocated. Powerful actors do not tend to evenly exchange 
relationships with less powerful actors (Johnson, 1993). As the percentage of power reflected 
decreases for employees, they are likely to lose access to powerful others and experience 
structural holes. 
In sum, indicators of prominence primarily address vertical relationships in terms of 
informal status, whereas structural autonomy indicators address horizontal relationships (Burt, 
1991). Prominence and structural autonomy provide distinct yet complementary descriptions of 
structural holes in network relationships as organizational change shapes both horizontal and 
vertical work relationships. Combined, the complementary characteristics of structural autonomy 
and prominence can provide a broader assessment of structural holes in a network. 
 
Downsizing's Impact on Structural Holes 
Organizational downsizing is a common organizational practice that has received much 
attention over the past decade and a half (Uchitelle & Klienfield, 1996). In its wake, downsizing 
produces unemployment, underemployment, and disruptions to organizational processes. 
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Downsizing requires layoff survivors to reconfigure their patterns of communication and work 
processes to adapt to the modified organizational structure. Furthermore, resulting coworker loss 
and “survivor guilt” greatly affect surviving workers’ functioning and attitudes in the 
postdownsizing environment (Gutknecht & Keys, 1993). Experts estimate that organizations will 
continue to use downsizing as a tool to remain competitive in a fast-changing marketplace 
(Bruton, Keels, & Shook, 1996; Gottlieb & Conkling, 1995). 
In relatively stable communication networks, there is little fluctuation in the 
configuration of relationships (Johnson, 1993). Previous studies of structural holes measure 
network configurations under stable conditions and demonstrate that structural holes create 
advantages or disadvantages for organizational members (Burt, 1992a, 1992b). Although the 
investigation of organizational networks under stable conditions is informative, organizations 
often operate under continually changing conditions (Levy & Merry, 1986). Any fluctuation to 
an organizational network can create changes in the configuration and location of structural holes 
in that network. Under normal organizational conditions, network members adjust to minor 
fluctuations in their network due to promotions and turnover by forging new links and/or 
solidifying existing relationships. In other words, network members, at their own will, open and 
close structural holes to create advantageous situations and maximize their network resources. 
However, under downsizing conditions, employees have little influence over the distribution of 
their relationships as structural holes open and close with the loss of personnel and the 
reassignment of responsibilities. 
To date, little is known about the relationship between downsizing and organizational 
networks or how structural holes resulting from downsizing affect the surviving network 
members. A natural setting to observe the effects of changing structural hole configurations is 
  
17 
 
during an organizational downsizing. A network prior to a downsizing could be considered stable 
or routine, whereas the network following the downsizing would be considered unstable. 
Downsizing represents an extreme test of structural holes and an examination of their 
nomological validity. An extreme test is consistent with McGuire’s (1983) concept of contextual 
knowledge, implying it is valuable to test concepts in a range of settings. Consequently, as a first 
step in this investigation, we ask the following: 
RQl: What structural autonomy and prominence elements contribute to a measure of 
employees’ structural hole experiences under pre- and postdownsizing 
conditions? 
RQ2: How do organizational members’ structural hole experiences change as a result of 
downsizing? 
 
Structural Holes and Chaos 
Downsizing creates observable voids in organizational networks. Perceptions of chaos 
are a likely consequence of downsizing as work-related problems, surprises, and unpredictable 
situations emerge with the loss of coworkers. Layoff survivors may also have new superiors, 
coworkers, and subordinates as well as new work roles and work locations. However, structural 
holes may also uniquely contribute to perceptions of organizational chaos. Employees 
experiencing structural holes due to the loss of key information sources are likely to feel caught 
off guard by managerial decisions and not understand the rationale for the actions of their units 
or other units. Increases in structural holes following a downsizing may continue over months to 
exacerbate disconnected employees’ perceptions of disorganization until their network contacts 
are replaced. 
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Given employees’ unique set of network relationships, changes in structural holes may 
also differentially affect each member’s perception of chaos. Although employees lose access to 
valued information sources, they can gain a connection to an employee who settles their nerves 
by providing key information. In this case, network changes may not result in increased 
perceptions of chaos. If a downsizing increased employees’ structural hole experiences and left 
them more isolated, but preserved their vital redundant contacts, employees may perceive 
rationality and order as their readily identifiable “group” remained intact. While individual 
structural hole experiences will be unique, we predict that, overall, employees experiencing 
structural holes will be positively related to their perceptions of organizational chaos. 
 
Structural Holes and Openness to Change 
Survivors’ responses to an organizational intervention can have a considerable impact on 
unit productivity (Gutknecht & Keys, 1993; Whetten & Cameron, 1994). Employees may resist 
interventions by slowing their work pace, “going through the motions” of implementing a new 
policy, or promoting animosity against the leaders of the change effort. In some cases, 
organizational changes lead valued employees to seek employment elsewhere. Employees may 
advance an intervention’s intended outcomes by exerting themselves to achieve goals or trusting 
in management’s decision to alter operations or work patterns. 
Employees’ support for or hostility toward an intervention largely depends on how the 
intervention affects them. Prior research indicates that downsizing does not affect employees 
uniformly (Freeman & Cameron, 1993). Some employees may report that a downsizing 
improved their work situation in terms of reducing complexity or bureaucracy (Cameron, 
Freeman, & Mishra, 1991) while devastating others’ work settings (Cascio, 1993). Structural 
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hole experiences may explain the variability in survivors’ openness to participate in 
postdownsizing changes. For instance, layoff survivors who lose resources through an increase in 
structural holes are unlikely to support change- related initiatives. In contrast, layoff survivors 
who gain resources as structural holes close in their network are likely to embrace change-related 
initiatives. These patterns are likely to continue over time. Employees increasingly isolated by 
structural holes may become embittered and see little benefit in supporting an organization that 
increases the difficulty of their work and limits their resources. Yet, the experience of closing 
structural holes after one of the most feared and unpleasant organizational events may embed a 
belief that management knows what they are doing and their postdownsizing initiatives should 
be supported. Thus, we predict the following: 
H1: Increases in layoff survivors’ structural hole experiences are positively related to 
their perceptions of chaos and negatively related to their willingness to participate 
in change. Decreases in structural hole experiences are negatively related to 
survivor’s perceptions of chaos but positively related to their openness to 
participate in change. 
H1a: Two months after the downsizing, increases in structural hole experiences are 
associated with increases in survivors’ perceptions of chaos and decreases in their 
willingness to participate in change. 
H1b: Increases in structural hole experiences immediately following the downsizing will 
continue to positively affect survivors’ perceptions of chaos but negatively affect 
their willingness to participate in change 5 months following the downsizing. 
  
  
20 
 
Method 
Procedure 
Employee’s communication network relationships and attitudes were measured 60 days 
prior to (T1) and 60 (T2) and 150 (T3) days following an organizational downsizing. At all three 
data collection points, subjects completed surveys measuring communication structure. 
Subjects’general attitudes were assessed at T2 and T3. Due to the nature of reporting 
communication network relationships, strict anonymity was not possible for the participants. 
However, participants were assured strict confidentiality in their responses and were guaranteed 
that their names, or the name of their company, would not appear under any circumstances on 
any report generated from the data. 
 
Participants 
Ninety-seven employees from a large international hospitality company’s corporate 
office could be described as approximately 57% male and 43% female, between the ages of 20 
and 57 (M = 33), and working for the company an average of 4.5 years. At all three data 
collection points, participants represented accounting, finance, marketing, rooms, engineering, 
administration, and personnel units.
2
 
 
Measurement 
Network relationships. This study measured the distribution of each participant’s work-
related contacts (Johnson, 1993; Monge & Contractor, 1987). Participants were provided with an 
alphabetized directory of all employees listed by functional unit, based on information provided 
by the participating organization. By the request of the organization, the participants were asked 
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to report formal work relationships only by indicating which organizational members they had 
spoken with dining the course of a normal work week. The administrative decision to seek 
“formal communication relationships only” can exclude naturally occurring relationships that are 
not easily classified as a single type of communication (Burt & Schott, 1985). Although informal 
work relationships are important in coping with a postdownsizing environment, the organization 
believed that the downsizing would make participants reluctant to report nonjob relevant 
relationships and influence their responses in data collections. Due to the exploratory nature of 
this investigation, a trade-off was made to keep the participants’ report of relationships simple at 
the dyadic level with the hopes of revealing more complex relationships at the organizational 
level (Burt & Schott, 1985). We were also concerned with minimizing participants’ response 
burden over multiple data collections (Marsden, 1990). 
A linkage was defined as any reported connection between two network members. In 
these analyses, the prerequisite of reciprocity among relationships was not required (e.g., a 
relationship did not have to be bidirectional 
 
Measurement 
 Network relationships. This study measured the distribution of each participant’s work-
related contacts (Johnson, 1993; Monge & Contractor, 1987). Participants were provided with an 
alphabetized directory of all employees listed by functional unit, based on information provided 
by the participating organization. By the request of the organization, the participants were asked 
to report formal work relationships only by indicating which organizational members they had 
spoken with dining the course of a normal work week. The administrative decision to seek 
“formal communication relationships only” can exclude naturally occurring relationships that are 
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not easily classified as a single type of communication (Burt & Schott, 1985). Although informal 
work relationships are important in coping with a post downsizing environment, the organization 
believed that the downsizing would make participants reluctant to report nonjob relevant 
relationships and influence their responses in data collections. Due to the exploratory nature of 
this investigation, a trade-off was made to keep the participants’ report of relationships simple at 
the dyadic level with the hopes of revealing more complex relationships at the organizational 
level (Burt & Schott, 1985). We were also concerned with minimizing participants’ response 
burden over multiple data collections (Marsden, 1990). 
 A linkage was defined as any reported connection between two network members. In 
these analyses, the prerequisite of reciprocity among relationships was not required (e.g., a 
relationship did not have to be bidirectional to be recorded as a connection between two 
members) to ensure the full range of relationships for the prominence calculations. Only the 
direct linkages of each participant were used in the analyses, since they represent the best 
indicators of structural holes. Direct linkages were defined as a direct connection reported 
between two network members, which was not mediated by other connections. Structure 4.2 
(Burt, 1991) network analysis program determined the communication patterns in the network at 
T1, T2,  and T3 data collection periods with 97 participants. Specifically, Burt’s (1991) structural 
autonomy and prominence measures from Structure 4.2 were used to summarize the distribution 
of opportunity and constraint across individual relationships in the network.
3, 4
 
 
 Computation of the index. To prepare the network analysis output for subsequent 
analyses, Structure 4.2 output, which appeared in decimal form, was initially multiplied by a 
constant to convert it to integer form. Only the nonredundant tie output did not require this 
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conversion. These transformations allowed the data for each structural hole indicator to be 
combined and contrasted on a standard metric. Following the integer conversion of the network 
output, a z score was calculated for each autonomy and prominence item, per subject, for use in 
subsequent statistical analyses. For purposes of interpretation, four indicators (i.e., nonredundant 
contacts, contact efficiency, extensive ties, and exclusive ties) hypothesized to be negatively 
related to structural holes were reverse coded. Items that passed the tests of confirmatory factor 
analysis were combined into the index. Each retained structural hole item was assumed, a priori, 
to have equal weight in the index. 
 
 Survey measures. Survey measures evaluated subjects’ perceptions of organizational 
chaos and openness to organizational change during the post downsizing collection periods only 
(T2 and T3). Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each scale item on a 
5-point metric {strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree). Confirmatory 
factor analysis tests of internal consistency and parallelism (Hunter & Gerbing, 1982) were 
conducted on the organizational chaos and openness to change scales at T2 and T3. Factor 
analysis tests met the requirements that (a) less than 5% of items exceed their confidence interval 
and (b) chi-square tests on the sum of squares error for internal consistency and parallelism be 
nonsignificant. The final factor structure retained at T2 was applied and tested at T3. Items 
dropped at any one time period were automatically excluded from the other time period. Final 
item factor loadings and scale reliabilities are reported in Table 2. 
 
Organizational chaos was measured by a 10-item scale that assessed respondents' 
perception of the state of their work environment. As a consequence of factor analyses, the 
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retained organizational chaos measure consisting of nine items was internally consistent and 
exhibited nonsignificant sum of squares errors (   [36] = 2.56, p > .05 and    [36] = 4.09, p > 
.05 at T2 and T3, respectively). A high numerical response (i.e., 5) on the chaos scale indicated a 
high level of chaos. Employees' openness to participate in change was measured with an eight-
item scale (Miller, Johnson, & Grau, 1994) that assessed participants' willingness to participate 
in a planned change. The retained openness measure consisted of seven items. The sum of 
squares errors for openness were nonsignificant (   [21] = 3.45, p > .05 and    [21] = 6.45, p > 
.05 at T2 and T3, respectively). A high numerical response (i.e., 5) on this scale indicated a high 
level of openness to participate in change. 
 
Analyses 
The measurement model for the structural hole index was analyzed using confirmatory 
factor analysis (Hamilton & Hunter, 1988; Hunter & Gerbing, 1982). Tb assess changes in 
survivors' structural hole experiences, change scores were calculated for T1 to T2 and T2 to T3 to 
generate groupings of survivors' experienced increases versus decreases in structural holes. A 
repeated measures multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) tested for mean differences in 
structural hole experiences. 
The relationship of the structural hole indicators to chaos and openness over time were 
tested through multiple regression after checking correlations for specific error. In addition, the 
individual relationships of structural hole items and the structural hole index were compared to 
the dependent variables to assess if the combined index demonstrated greater predictive validity 
to specified outcomes than the single-item indicators (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Schwab, 1980). 
Tb examine the interdependence of observations among the network and attitudinal self-report 
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measures and to ensure that the autonomy and prominence index items were independent of each 
other, the following precautions were taken: (a) the Durbin-Watson d was calculated to examine 
the correlations among the variables' error terms (residuals; Bowerman & O'Connell, 1990);
5
 (b) 
the partial correlations of each structural hole indicator were examined to determine individual 
item contribution to the index; and (c) the index itself was put to a test of parallelism, which 
treats interdependence by producing a unidimensional scale as opposed to using individual items 
that may be multicolinear in character (Johnson, Meyer, Berkowitz, Ethington, & Miller, 1997). 
 
Results 
Structural Hole Index 
The first research question asked which elements contributed to a measure of employees' 
structural hole experiences. Pearson product-moment correlations of the structural hole 
indicators are reported in Table 3. As presented in Table 4, the results of confirmatory factor 
analyses of the structural hole index revealed that four items fit the requirement of internal 
consistency and produced a reliable index at all three time periods. A factor solution was first 
calculated on the T2 data, which were believed to be the most unstable (i.e., 2 months following 
the downsizing). The retained four items were nonredundant contacts, constraint, extensive ties, 
and exclusive ties. The Reliability (Cronbach, 1951) of the retained scale was .94 at each time 
period. The retained prominence indicators (extensive and exclusive relations) exhibited sound 
psychometric properties when combined with the structural autonomy indicators (constraint and 
nonredundant ties). These indicators were consistently and strongly correlated in each of the 
three time periods, and the error produced in comparison to the predicted inter-item correlations 
was within the expected confidence interval limits at p < .05 (Hunter & Gerbing, 1982). 
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The retained four items exhibited properties of internal consistency and met the criteria of 
parallelism specified by Hunter and Gerbing (1982) in each of the three time periods. The sum of 
squares errors for the structural hole index were nonsignificant (   [6] = 0.41, p > .05,    [6] = 
0.30,  p > .05, and    [10] = 0.31,  p > .05 at T1, T2,  and T3, respectively). The sum of squares 
errors for tests of parallelism of the structural hole scale, chaos, and openness were also 
nonsignificant (   [127] = 36.02,  p > .05,    [127] = 32.33,  p > .05, and    [127] = 47.73,  p > 
.05 at T1, T2, and T3, respectively).
6 
 
Change in Structural Hole Experiences 
The second research question asked how survivors’ structural hole experiences changed 
as a result of downsizing. According to the structural hole index’s test-retest correlations (see 
Table 5), survivors’ structural hole experiences were very stable between T2 and T3 (r = .97). 
With correlations, it was difficult to determine how structural hole experiences varied between 
T2 -T1 and T3-T2. Consequently, employees were divided into subgroups based on their structural 
hole experiences over time. Accordingly, change scores were computed to identify the direction 
of change in their structural hole experiences. Four subgroups were identified: (a) survivors 
experiencing increases in structural holes at both postdownsizing periods (n = 24), (b) survivors 
experiencing increases between T1 and T2 but decreases between T2 and T3  (n = 25), (c) 
survivors experiencing decreases between T1 and T2 but increases between T2 and T3 (n = 20), 
and (d) survivors experiencing decreases in both post downsizing periods (n = 16).
7
 Figure 1 
displays the distribution of structural hole changes. 
An examination of structural hole mean scores for each period by subgroups in Table 6 
indicated remarkable differences in the patterns of structural hole experiences (negative scores 
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indicate fewer structural holes, and positive scores indicate more structural holes). Results of a 1 
x 4 repeated measures MANOVA revealed significant differences in survivors’ structural hole 
scores over time due to their subgroup affiliation, F(3, 160) = 17.71,  p < .0001, R
2
 = .64). 
 
Predicting Chaos and Openness to Change 
The hypothesized relationships between employees’ structural hole experiences and their 
post downsizing reactions were tested through multiple regression with (a) the summated 
structural hole index and (b) the individual structural hole indicators (simultaneously entered) on 
chaos and openness at T2 and T3 in case individual structural autonomy and prominence indicators 
had better nomological validity. Variable means, standard deviations, and correlations of the 
structural hole index with chaos and openness are reported in Table 5. Regression analyses and 
tests of independence for both the individual indicators and the combined index with chaos and 
openness to participate in change as the dependent variables are reported in Table 7 and Table 8, 
respectively.  
As indicated in Table 7, the structural hole index was a modest predictor of chaos with 
standardized regression coefficients (p) ranging from .16 to .28, suggesting that those 
experiencing structural holes were likely to experience chaos. Whereas the T2 static relationship 
between structural holes and chaos was nonsignificant, the static relationship at T3 was 
significant in addition to the lagged relationship between structural hole experiences at T2 and 
perception of chaos at T3. In some cases, individual indicators produced a slightly higher R
2
 and 
multiple correlation coefficient than the index. In each of the regression equations with the 
individual indicators, several of the partial correlations did not differ from zero, indicating a 
spurious relationship with chaos. Although multicolinearity was evident in each time period, 
  
28 
 
with strong correlations among individual scale items (Bowerman & O’Connell, 1990), the 
Durbin-Watson tests of independence suggested that the resulting error terms were not 
significantly correlated and supported the use of the combined index to predict perceptions of 
chaos. 
The results of the regression analyses indicated that experiences of structural holes were 
negatively related to survivors’ openness to participate in change, with multiple correlation 
coefficients ranging from –.04 to -–24. Whereas the T2 static relationship between structural 
holes and openness to participate in change was nonsignificant, the static relationship at T3 was 
significant. The lagged relationship between structural hole experiences at T2 and openness to 
participate in change at T3  was also significant. As noted earlier, in some cases the individual 
items produced a slightly higher R
2
 and multiple correlation coefficient than the index, but the 
items displayed independence as indicated by tests of the Durbin-Watson d statistic. 
 Whereas the structural hole index was consistently related to chaos and openness at T2 
and T3, a considerable shift occurred in employee attitudes between T2 and T3. Following the 
downsizing at T2, employees perceived a moderate level of chaos (M = 3.19) and were not open 
to participate in changes (M = 2.79). At T3, survivors’ responses reversed in direction (chaos M = 
2.14; openness M = 4.02). Results of paired comparison t-tests indicated significant differences 
in employee T2 and T3 chaos and openness scores (t [91] = -6.35, p = .0001 and t [93] = 6.81, p = 
.0001, respectively). 
 
Post Hoc Analyses 
As indicated above, considerable differences existed over time in survivors’ structural 
hole experiences, perceptions of organizational chaos, and their openness to change. Two post 
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hoc analyses were conducted to assess survivors’ unique experiences. First, scatter plots of the 
data were produced by separating participants’ structural hole experiences into three subgroups 
(low, moderate, and high) in each time period. Low structural hole experiences were defined as 
less than 0, moderate structural hole experiences were defined as being from 0 to .5, and high 
structural hole experiences were defined as greater than .5. Results indicated several unique 
patterns according to their experiences. Survivors experiencing moderate levels of structural 
holes at T3 perceived higher levels of chaos at T3. In comparison, those experiencing high or low 
levels of structural holes at T3 did not report high levels of chaos and appeared more apt to cope 
with network changes. In fact, survivors experiencing high levels of structural holes at T3 
displayed a parabolic relationship with chaos at T3. As their structural holes increased, eventually 
their report of chaos decreased. Survivors experiencing moderate and high levels of structural 
holes at T2 were less open to change at T3, suggesting that those most affected by structural holes 
after the downsizing are the least accepting of change. 
 Second, survivors’ responses were divided into four groups on the basis of their 
experiencing increases or decreases in structural holes over time (see Table 6). For those with 
increases in structural holes across T2 - T1 and T3 -T2, their structural hole experiences were 
positively correlated with chaos and negatively related to openness to change at both T2 and T3. 
These patterns were consistent for both static and lagged comparisons. 
 For survivors who initially showed increases but then decreases in structural holes, their 
structural hole experiences at T2 were positively related to openness to change at T2. Subsequent 
network changes had an equivocal impact on perceptions of chaos and openness to change at T3. 
Among employees who initially showed decreases but then increases in structural holes, 
structural hole experiences were positively related to openness at T2 but negatively related to 
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openness to change at T3. Although the initial closing of structural holes was positively received, 
the later increase in structural holes undermined employees’ willingness to participate in change. 
 For survivors with decreases in structural holes at both time periods, their structural hole 
experiences at T2 and T3 were positively related to openness to change at T3, whereas the 
opposite relationship existed at T2 (i.e., more chaos and less openness). In short, post hoc 
analyses revealed that (a) survivors experiencing consistent increases in structural holes viewed 
the organization to be in disarray and were not receptive to plans by management, (b) survivors 
experiencing consistent decreases in structural holes after several months became open to 
changes, and (c) survivors whose structural hole experiences reversed between T2 and T3 
accordingly reversed their attitudes about the downsizing by T3. 
 
Discussion 
Perhaps no other single event such as a downsizing tells dismissed and surviving 
employees alike that they are disposable. The wisdom of downsizing is openly questioned in the 
popular press. Downsizing devastates employee morale and trust in management and leads to the 
absence of demonstrated improvements in earnings or stock market performance (Koretz, 1997). 
Few downsizing efforts generate their desired organizational outcomes (Cameron, in press; 
Cascio, 1993; Whetten & Cameron, 1994) and as much as 75% of downsizings may leave the 
organization in worse shape than before (Keidel, 1994). This study offers insights into the 
negative as well as positive effects of downsizing by focusing on the opening and closing of 
structural holes in employee networks. The results of this study indicate that a combined index 
can measure employees’ structural hole experiences before and after a downsizing, and, although 
structural holes at T2 are positively related to their perceptions of organizational chaos and 
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negatively related to their willingness to participate in the change, the impact of structural holes 
varies dramatically given the pattern of survivors’ structural hole experiences. The following 
section discusses the implications of these findings for organizations and downsizing survivors. 
 
Structural Holes Before and Following Downsizing 
Whereas earlier research on structural holes examined a limited number of the structural 
autonomy indicators, the complementary relationship between structural autonomy 
(nonredundant contacts, constraint) and prominence (extensive ties, exclusive ties) items in this 
investigation suggests that changes in organizational networks are associated with access to 
network information and resources (i.e., structural autonomy) and with influence and power (i.e., 
prominence). The structural hole index produced a continuum ranging from the experience of 
“no holes” to “many holes” and provided more precise insight into the effects of downsizing by 
examining employees’ network experiences. As structural holes form and close dining 
organizational change processes, the index gauges these changes. Thus, analyses of structural 
holes may be particularly useful in examining communication relationships during periods of 
convergence and reorientation during organizational change (Freeman & Cameron, 1993; 
Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). 
A structural hole index that combines prominence and autonomy measures represents an 
important extension of the conceptualization and measurement of structural holes within 
organizations. Future investigations can assess the presence and impact of structural holes and 
changes to communication networks at the individual level, among intact work units, within 
departments, or throughout the organization. For example, downsizing is usually evaluated in 
terms of financial net gain for the organization, economic loss for the community, and the 
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physical and psychological consequences to laid-off and surviving employees (Kozlowski et al., 
1993). Yet, measurements like the structural hole index may enable researchers and/or managers 
to identify (a) critical links in the network that should be preserved and (b) potential trouble spots 
where structural holes are rampant and additional support is vital for individual, group, or 
departmental functioning. In short, structural hole indexes that combine structural autonomy and 
prominence indicators can advance the study of structural holes by providing a tangible 
connection between network structure and individual responses (i.e., the integration of macro- 
and microlevel analyses) in organizational communication research (Hartman & Johnson, 1989, 
1990; Indik, 1965; Krackhardt & Porter, 1985, 1986; Monge & Eisenberg, 1987). 
 The index also addresses problems that result from multicolinearity and interdependence 
with individual structural autonomy and prominence items and provides an alternative to the 
quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) (e.g., Hubert & Schultz, 1976; Krackhardt & Porter, 
1986) for handling nonindependence in network analysis indicators. The QAP examines patterns 
of similarity among networks and uses all dyadic information present in each matrix (Krackhardt 
& Porter, 1986). Although the QAP and structural hole index both deal with the problem of 
multicolinearity, they should be applied as analyses dictate. The QAP is most appropriate for 
comparisons with data from several different networks. In this investigation, all calculations 
were produced from binary data (from the same network) that indicated either the existence or 
absence of a relationship between each network member. Although each of the structural hole 
indicators is unique in its calculation, each is somewhat dependent on the other indicators. Thus, 
it is important in future research to assess the linear dependence of network indicators and their 
relationship to attitudinal or behavioral measures. 
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The Impact of Structural Holes on Employee Responses 
Downsizings do not affect employees equally. As revealed through the structural hole 
analyses, some downsized employees are disadvantaged due to a loss of information contacts and 
resources, whereas others improve their position in the network and gain from the change. These 
shifts in networks can have serious ramifications for employees who may be emotionally 
strained by survivor guilt or distrust in the organization. Even if employees' network situations 
improved due to a downsizing, why should they support management’s imposed changes when 
they may be the next to be released? Or, how will their work relationships change again when 
management discovers that the desired postdownsizing outcomes are not going to be realized? It 
is in light of these constraints and questions that the patterns of survivors’ structural hole 
experiences become important for interpreting the impact of a downsizing. 
 For employees who experienced increases in structural holes at T2 and T3, their structural 
holes experiences were consistently related to seeing the organization in chaos and to resisting 
changes in the workplace. In many ways, layoff survivors fitting this category may be the most 
disadvantaged by the downsizing. As structural holes continue to form in their network, they 
become increasingly detached from others. In a sparse network, employees must rely on a few 
(and most likely similar) others for information and resources. Thus, they have less means by 
which to sort through discordant information that could contribute to their perception of the 
organization being chaotic. By becoming increasingly less powerful in their network as well as 
losing contacts, they see fewer benefits from supporting organizational changes. 
 In contrast, employees who experienced decreases in structural holes at T2 and T3 
theoretically benefited the most from the downsizing. However, the lagged effect in their 
openness to change may reflect the width of their network contacts as well as the harshness of a 
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downsizing. On one hand, experiencing a closing of structural holes may have placed these 
employees in greater contact with others who were feeling greater isolation and loss from the 
downsizing. Given that job attitudes are in part shaped by interactions with others (Salancik & 
Pfeffer, 1978), interactions with less fortunate others shaped the attitudes of employees 
experiencing decreases in structural holes. Only later did they realize the benefits of losing 
structural holes and improve their willingness to participate in organizational changes. On the 
other hand, downsizing has such a negative effect on employees’ emotions that there is a 
threshold of information or trust that has to be overcome before employees begin to see changes 
to their network position in a positive light. 
For employees with reversals in structural hole experiences, their attitudes about the 
change mirrored their structural hole increases or decreases. However, numerous questions arise 
from their boomerang experience. For instance, what are the long-term consequences for those 
who experienced decreases and then increases in structural holes? It is possible that these 
survivors over the next year will be the least trusting of management and the least inclined to 
build long-term relationships with their coworkers, since they know that relationships can 
quickly change. The initial decrease in structural holes and subsequent increase also raises 
concerns about their network position. Even though they initially benefited (in terms of closing 
structural holes) from the downsizing, what aspects of their job or network position led them to 
become vulnerable in a generally stable network period (i.e., T3 - T2)? Related questions can be 
asked of employees who initially experienced structural hole increases and then experienced 
decreases. In this case, it would be valuable to know if structural holes decreased due to being 
sought by other organizational members, a change in job responsibilities, or their own efforts to 
become more connected to their network. Consequently, research exploring shifts in employees' 
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structural holes may provide critical information regarding the impact of downsizing on 
employee networks and employees' roles in closing or opening structural holes. 
 
Limitations 
Network samples are difficult to obtain due to the complex and personal nature of data 
collection, and represent participants' self-reports of their organizational network interaction 
(Monge & Contractor, 1987). In this study, the participating organization desired that the 
participants report only formal work relationships. It was presumed that downsizing would affect 
formal work relationships more severely and workers would be reluctant to report informal 
relationships that were not related to their work roles. However, in any network, both formal and 
informal relationships drive employee behavior and attitudes. Thus, formal relationships may be 
an underrepresentation of employees' network interaction because informal ties also provide 
valuable resources not always available from formal ties. Recent investigations of network 
relationships and their impact among organizational members differentiate structural hole 
influences (which are based on the information access and control benefits it provides) from 
Philos or Simmelian influences (which are based on social facilitation, connection, and trust 
among a network group) (Krackhardt, 1992, 1995; Sparrowe & Liden, 1997). Given that network 
relationships may serve varying purposes, future investigations should test for differences in 
structural influences due to formal and informal relationships and examine how survivors’ 
reactions to downsizing differ along formal and informal lines. Researchers should also attempt 
to gather larger samples of networks undergoing downsizing to further explore the many 
tentative conclusions drawn from this study. 
Several of the autonomy and prominence measures were excluded from this study. The 
exclusion was necessary given the limits inherent in the collection and analysis of binary 
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network data. Information related to oligopoly was not available from the participants through 
the data collection, and the interconnectedness and density of relationships within the resulting 
network sample limited the possible analyses. It may be the case that the excluded structural 
autonomy and prominence items suggest other relevant network applications or that the excluded 
items were indicators of other network phenomena. For instance, the excluded items may be 
indicators of macro phenomena not addressed in this research (cf. Burt, 1992b). To further 
explore micro- and macrobased relationships in organizations, the application of the excluded 
items may be warranted in future research on structural holes in networks. 
Regarding the study’s design, Williams and Podsakoff (1989) recommended that 
longitudinal data should be collected at intervals accurately representing the issues under study. 
In this particular investigation, decisions about the timing and frequency of the data collection 
sought to accommodate the needs of the participating organization (60 days prior to and 60 and 
150 days following the downsizing). It is possible that the relationship between structural holes, 
chaos, and openness may have fluctuated more widely at intervals not measured immediately 
following the downsizing. Future investigations of this type should consider smaller time frames, 
with more frequent collection periods. As Johnson (1985) asserted, researchers receive little 
guidance on the gradual or evolutionary nature of change between variables that create 
difficulties in selecting sample frames. With these potential difficulties in mind, each field 
investigation, with its own unique needs and limits, should be carefully addressed in the research 
design. 
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Conclusion 
Although plans for downsizing and its implementation may stem from a primarily 
financial focus, it is clear that downsizing affects the communication relationships of surviving 
network members by opening and closing structural holes in its wake. Given the importance of 
employee responses to planned organizational interventions, paying attention to structural hole 
developments may well serve those who plan organizational change. In the case of downsizing, 
the impact of increases and decreases in structural hole experiences on employee responses is 
complex and should be followed carefully. 
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Notes 
1. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 82nd Annual Conference of the 
Speech Communication Association, San Diego, California, 1996. The authors would 
like to thank Franklin J. Boster, Georgia T. Chao, Ronald F. Cichy, Marshall Scott Poole, 
and the anonymous reviewers and editors for their suggestions on earlier versions of this 
manuscript. 
2. The sample at T1 consisted of 130 participants; the 97 participants at T2 and T3  are the 
layoff survivors. Only the responses from the 97 survivors at all three time periods were 
included in the analyses. 
3. In the measurement of structural holes, it is believed that the use of direct network 
linkages represents the most effective means to assess network members’ encounters of 
structural holes. When using indirect linkages, there is no way to determine what is being 
transferred through the relationship. Indirect linkages commonly involve gatekeeping, 
blocking, filtering, and innuendo that are less inherently present in direct linkages. As a 
result of organizational change, the confounding characteristics of indirect linkages may 
be exaggerated. Furthermore, employees’ experiences of structural holes are primarily 
based on their direct contacts rather than more distant contacts. When expanding the 
measurement of structural holes to include Burt’s (1991) prominence indicators, direct 
linkages were used to remain consistent with the measures of structural autonomy that 
were applied. 
4. The indicators of choice status, power, and percentage of power reflected could not be 
accurately represented from the use of direct linkages only and were excluded from the 
index. The number of contacts was not included in the index because of its lack of 
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differentiation between redundant and nonredundant contacts. The measure of 
proportional density was also excluded from the index because the binary network data 
collected here restricted the range of the responses and produced precisely the same 
output as for network density. Finally, the measure of oligopoly could not be calculated 
without additional survey data not available from the participants at the times of 
collection and was excluded from the index. Thus, the final test of the structural hole 
index was based on the remaining network indicators: nonredundant contacts, constraint, 
network density, contact efficiency, hierarchy, extensive relations, and exclusive 
relations. 
5. The Durbin-Watson d tests the null hypothesis that the error terms (residuals) are not 
positively correlated. If the d statistic exceeds the critical value (for N= 97 and k - 1), one 
does not reject the null suggesting that the error terms are not correlated. This test is 
based on the assumption that the error terms are normally distributed. 
6. To conduct the tests of parallelism with the T1 structural hole index, the measures of 
chaos and openness were used from T2 due to the fact that chaos and openness data were 
not collected prior to the downsizing at T1.  
7. Nine subjects were excluded from the correlational analyses because they experienced no 
change at T2 - T1 and/or T3 - T2. 
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Table 1. A Description of Structural Autonomy and Prominence Items. 
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Table 2. Factor Loadings and Reliabilities for Chaos and Openness at Time 2 and Time 3. 
 
a. These items were reverse coded. 
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Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of the Individual Structural Hole 
Items at T1, T2, and T3. 
 
(con’t) 
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Note. N = 97. Correlations above .23 are significant at the p < .01 level, and z-score means 
different from zero on variables 1-21 are due to rounding error.  
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Table 4. Factor Loadings and Reliabilities for the Structural Hole Index at T1, T2, and T3. 
 
Note. Cronbach’s alpha = .94 for T1, T2, and T3. Contact efficiency, network density, and 
hierarchy were excluded from the index. 
a. These items were reverse coded. 
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Table 5. Scale Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for the Final Factors at T1, T2 
and T3.  
 
Note: N = 97. Correlations above .24 are significant at the p < .01 level, and z score means 
different than zero on variables 1, 2, and 3 are due to rounding error. 
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Table 6.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Participants in the Four 
Subgroups. 
 
  
  
53 
 
Table 7. Comparisons of the Individual Autonomy and Prominence Items to the Structural 
Hole Index 
.  
Note. N = 97. 
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Table 8. Comparisons of the Individual Autonomy and Prominence Items to the Structural 
Hole Index 
 
Note. N = 97. 
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Figure 1. Display of Changes in Downsizing Survivors’ Structural Hole Experiences Over 
Time 
 
